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COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE AND LENIENCY  
 
Mark Clough* 
 
his Note identifies certain issues for discussion relating to 
competition law compliance and leniency. First, the definition 
of leniency: immunity from, or reduction of, what risks and penal-
ties should be offered to a leniency applicant to encourage disclo-
sure of secret cartels. Sub-issues include: Is it sufficient incentive 
for companies only to grant immunity from fines? Does immunity 
from fines actually benefit companies when they can pass on the 
cost of fines to consumers in the form of higher prices or to share-
holders in lower dividends? Would more companies disclose secret 
cartels if they were also given immunity from civil damages 
suits? Finally, would granting immunity from damages claims un-
dermine the value of a leniency program from the cartel victim's 
viewpoint, bearing in mind joint and several liability rules permit 
all the losses caused by a cartel to be claimed against any one of 
the cartel members on their own?  
Second, can immunity or reduction of the penalties availa-
ble only to a company be a sufficient incentive to management or 
employees involved in, or aware of, a secret cartel to disclose it to 
a competition authority for the purposes of investigation and ter-
mination? Further, does the experience in the United Kingdom 
since cartel criminalization support the general introduction of 
criminal personal penalties such as fines and imprisonment as well 
as penalties for responsible directors in the form of director dis-
qualification? Also, will the European Commission’s approach to 
protect employees and directors from individual personal civil and 
criminal sanctions in its March 2017 Proposal for a Directive (Ar-
ticle 22) on the European Competition Network (“ECN”) Member 
States’ powers have a similar effect?  
Third, who can prove they are the first in line? How can 
greater legal certainty be established for the use of marker systems 
and the evidence tests applied in leniency programs, for example, 
by the European Commission?  
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Fourth, do international guidelines assist to standardize the 
leniency practice of competition authorities if there is no interna-
tional court to sit in judgment on their application?  
Fifth, how can the ECN best practice guidelines be im-
proved? Is the section on leniency in the Commission's proposal for 
a new directive on ECN powers and cooperation sufficient to en-
sure uniform marker systems and common standards of evidence? 
(See the Annex for Articles 16 to 22, requiring the EU Member 
States effectively to legislate for the application of the ECN Leni-
ency guidelines).  
Sixth, how can the International Competition Network 
(“ICN”) best practice model leniency program be improved? (See 
Brussels 1461847.1). 
Seventh, what lessons can be learned by other jurisdictions 
from leniency practice in the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, 
Australia, Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa? 
Eighth, does the ECN or ICN model leniency program en-
courage competition compliance? Does the availability of immun-
ity from fines encourage cartels because companies know they can 
always try to gain immunity from fines by being the first to disclose 
the secret cartel? Also, without any coherent leniency programs, is 
it likely that secret cartels would remain undisclosed? Further-
more, would the introduction of a global requirement to file all car-
tel behavior with an authority like the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission or the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority 
(“FCA”), subject to avoidance under a leniency program, result in 
even greater compliance?  
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Annex  
CHAPTER VI  
LENIENCY  
 
Article 16  
Immunity from fines  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties have in place leniency programs that enable them to grant im-
munity from fines to undertakings.  
2. Member States shall ensure that immunity can be granted only 
if the undertaking  
a) fulfills the conditions laid down in Article 18;  
b) discloses its participation in a secret cartel; and  
c) is the first to submit evidence which:  
i. at the time the national competition authority receives 
the application, enables it to carry out a targeted inspec-
tion in connection with the secret cartel, provided that the 
national competition authority did not yet have in its pos-
session evidence to carry out an inspection in connection 
with the secret cartel or had not already carried out such 
an inspection; or  
ii. in the national competition authority's view, enables 
the finding of an infringement of competition law, pro-
vided that the national competition authority did not yet 
have in its possession evidence to find such an infringe-
ment and that no other undertaking previously qualified 
for immunity under paragraph 2(c)(i) in relation to the 
same cartel.  
3. Member States shall ensure that all undertakings are eligible for 
immunity from fines, with the exception of undertakings that have 
taken steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in a secret 
cartel.  
 
Article 17  
Reduction of fines Brussels 1461847.1  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties have in place leniency programs that enable them to grant a 
reduction of fines to undertakings which do not qualify for immun-
ity.  
2. Member States shall ensure that a reduction of fines is granted 
only if the conditions laid down in Article 18 are fulfilled and the 
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applicant discloses its participation in a secret cartel and provides 
the national competition authority with evidence of the alleged se-
cret cartel which represents significant added value for the purpose 
of proving an infringement of Article 101 TFEU or a correspond-
ing provision under national law, relative to the evidence already 
in the national competition authority’s possession at the time of the 
application.  
3. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties are able to grant an additional reduction of fines if the appli-
cant submits evidence which the national competition authority 
uses, without the need for further corroboration, to prove addi-
tional facts which lead to an increase in fines as compared to the 
fines that would otherwise have been imposed on the participants 
in the secret cartel. The reduction of fines for the applicant shall be 
proportionate to such increase in fines.  
 
Article 18  
General conditions for leniency  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in order to qualify for leniency, 
the applicant must satisfy the following cumulative conditions:  
a) it ended its involvement in the alleged secret cartel immedi-
ately following its application, except for what would, in the 
competent national competition authority’s view, be reasona-
bly necessary to preserve the integrity of its investigation;  
b) it cooperates genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis and ex-
peditiously with the national competition authority from the 
time of its application until the authority has closed its proceed-
ings against all parties under investigation by adopting a deci-
sion or has otherwise terminated its proceedings. This in-
cludes:  
i. providing the national competition authority promptly 
with all relevant information and evidence relating to the 
alleged secret cartel that comes into its possession or is 
available to it;  
ii. remaining at the national competition authority’s dis-
posal to answer any request that may contribute to the es-
tablishment of the facts;  
iii. making current (and, if possible, former) employees 
and directors available for interviews with the national 
competition authority;  
iv. not destroying, falsifying or concealing relevant infor-
mation or evidence; and  
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v. not disclosing the fact of, or any of the content of, its 
application before the national competition authority has 
issued objections in the proceedings before it, unless oth-
erwise agreed; and  
c) when contemplating making an application to the national 
competition authority, it must not have:  
i. destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence of the alleged 
secret cartel; or  
ii. disclosed the fact or any of the content of its contem-
plated application, except to other competition authori-
ties.  
 
Article 19  
Form of leniency applications  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that applicants can apply for leni-
ency in writing and that national competition authorities have a 
system in place that enables them to accept leniency statements ei-
ther orally or by other means that do not result in the production 
of documents, information, or other materials in the applicant’s 
possession, custody, or control.  
 
Article 20  
Marker for a formal application for immunity  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that an undertaking wishing to 
make an application for immunity can initially apply for a marker 
to national competition authorities. The marker grants the appli-
cant a place in the queue for a period to be specified on a case-by-
case basis by the national competition authority receiving the ap-
plication for a marker. It allows the applicant to gather the neces-
sary information and evidence in order to meet the relevant evi-
dential threshold for immunity.  
2. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties have discretion whether or not to grant a marker.  
3. Member States shall ensure that if the applicant perfects the 
marker within the specified period, the information and evidence 
provided will be deemed to have been submitted at the time the 
marker was granted.  
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Article 21  
Summary applications  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that applicants that have applied for 
leniency, either by applying for a market or by submitting a full 
application, to the Commission in relation to an alleged secret car-
tel can file summary applications in relation to the same cartel with 
the national competition authorities, which the applicant considers 
well-placed, to deal with the case.  
2. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties accept summary applications provided that they take one of 
the forms stipulated in Article 19, have the same product, geo-
graphic and durational scope as the leniency application filed with 
the Commission and include a short description of the following, 
in so far as it is known to the applicant at the time of the submis-
sion:  
a) the name and address of the applicant;  
b) the other parties to the alleged secret cartel;  
c) the affect product(s);  
d) the affected territory(ies);  
e) the duration;  
f) the nature of the alleged cartel conduct;  
g) the Member State(s) where the evidence is likely to be lo-
cated; and  
h) information on the applicant’s other past or possible future 
leniency applications in relation to the alleged secret cartel.  
3. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties refrain from requesting from the applicant any information re-
lated to the alleged infringement covered by the summary applica-
tion beyond the items set out in paragraph 2 before they require 
the submission of a full application pursuant to paragraph 6. Brus-
sels 1461847.1. 
4. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties which receive a summary application provide the applicant 
with an acknowledgement stating the date and time of receipt.  
5. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties which receive a summary application verify whether they al-
ready had received a previous summary or leniency application in 
relation to the same alleged secret cartel at the time of its receipt 
and inform the applicant accordingly.  
6. Member States shall ensure that applicants have the opportunity 
to submit full leniency applications, perfecting the summary appli-
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cations referred to in paragraph 1, to the national competition au-
thorities concerned, once the Commission has informed those au-
thorities that it does not intend to act on the case in whole or in 
part. Member States shall ensure that national competition author-
ities have the power to specify a reasonable period of time within 
which the applicant must submit the full application together with 
the corresponding evidence and information.  
7. Member States shall ensure that if the applicant submits the full 
application in accordance with paragraph 6, within the period 
specified by the national competition authority, the information 
contained therein will be deemed to have been submitted at the 
date and time of the summary application. If the applicant had 
submitted the summary application no later than 5 working days 
after filing the leniency application to the Commission, the sum-
mary application will be deemed to have been submitted at the 
date and time of the leniency application submitted to the Com-
mission.  
 
Article 22  
Interplay between leniency programs and sanctions on natural 
persons  
 
1. Member States shall ensure that current and former employees 
and directors of applicants for immunity from fines to competition 
authorities are protected from any criminal and administrative 
sanctions and from sanctions imposed in non-criminal judicial pro-
ceedings for their involvement in the secret cartel covered by the 
application, if these employees and directors actively cooperate 
with the competition authorities concerned and the immunity ap-
plication predates the start of the criminal proceedings. 
